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Abstract
We study the problem of multi-dimensional revenue maximization when selling m items
to a buyer that has additive valuations for them, drawn from a (possibly correlated) prior
distribution. Unlike traditional Bayesian auction design, we assume that the seller has a very
restricted knowledge of this prior: they only know the mean µj and an upper bound σj on the
standard deviation of each item’s marginal distribution. Our goal is to design mechanisms
that achieve good revenue against an ideal optimal auction that has full knowledge of the
distribution in advance. Informally, our main contribution is a tight quantification of the
interplay between the dispersity of the priors and the aforementioned robust approximation
ratio. Furthermore, this can be achieved by very simple selling mechanisms.
More precisely, we show that selling the items via separate price lotteries achieves an
O(log r) approximation ratio where r = maxj(σj/µj) is the maximum coefficient of variation
across the items. If forced to restrict ourselves to deterministic mechanisms, this guarantee
degrades to O(r2). Assuming independence of the item valuations, these ratios can be
further improved by pricing the full bundle. For the case of identical means and variances,
in particular, we get a guarantee of O(log(r/m)) which converges to optimality as the number
of items grows large. We demonstrate the optimality of the above mechanisms by providing
matching lower bounds. Our tight analysis for the deterministic case resolves an open gap
from the work of Azar and Micali [ITCS’13].
As a by-product, we also show how one can directly use our upper bounds to improve
and extend previous results related to the parametric auctions of Azar et al. [SODA’13].
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1 Introduction
Optimal auction design is one of the most well-studied and fundamental problems in (algorith-
mic) mechanism design. In the traditional Myersonian [45] setting, an auctioneer has a single
item for sale and there are n interested bidders. Each bidder has a (private) valuation for the
item which, intuitively, represents the amount of money they are willing to spend to buy it. The
standard Bayesian approach is to assume that the seller has only an incomplete knowledge of
these valuations, in the form of a prior joint distribution F . A selling mechanism receives bids
from the buyers and then decides to whom the item should be allocated (which, in general, can
be a randomized rule) and for what price. The goal is to design a truthful1 selling mechanism
that maximizes the auctioneer’s revenue, in expectation over F .
Myerson [45] provided a complete and very elegant solution for this problem when bidder
valuations are independent, that is, F is a product distribution. In particular, when the distri-
butions are identical and further satisfy a regularity assumption, the optimal mechanism takes
the very satisfying form of a second-price (Vickrey) auction with a reserve price. Unfortunately,
in general these characterizations collapse when we move to multi-dimensional environments
where there are m > 1 items for sale. Multi-item optimal auction design is one of the most
challenging and currently active research areas of mechanism design. Given that the exact de-
scription of the revenue maximizing auctions in such settings is a notoriously hard task, there
is an impressive stream of recent papers, predominantly from the algorithmic game theory
community, that try to provide good approximation guarantees to the optimal revenue.
The critical common underlying assumption throughout the aforementioned optimal auction
design settings is that the seller has full knowledge of the prior joint distribution F of the bid-
ders’ valuations. In many applications though, this might arguably be an unrealistic assumption
to make: usually an auctioneer can derive some distributional properties about the bidder pop-
ulation, but to completely determine the actual distribution would require enormous resources.
Thus, inspired by the parametric auctions of Azar and Micali [1] for the single-dimensional
case, we would like to be able to design robust auctions that (1) make only use of minimal
statistical information about the valuation distribution, namely its mean and variance; and (2)
still provide good revenue guarantees even in the worst case against an adversarial selection
of the actual distribution F ; in particular, no further assumptions (e.g., independence of item
valuations or regularity) should in general be made about F . This is our main goal in this
paper.
1.1 Related Work
As mentioned in the introduction, there has been an impressive stream of recent work on
optimal [12, 23, 25, 29, 39] and approximately-optimal [4, 11, 15, 31, 36, 48, 49, 54] multi-
dimensional auction design, which tries to extend the traditional, single-dimensional auction
setting studied in the seminal paper of Myerson [45]. A prominent characteristic that can often
be seen in these papers is the “simplicity vs optimality” approach: knowing the computational
hardness [18, 19, 22] and structural complexity [23, 30] of describing exact optimality, emphasis
is placed on designing both simple and practical mechanisms that can still provide good revenue
guarantees. Of course, this idea can be traced back to the work of Hartline and Roughgarden
[33] and Bulow and Klemperer [9] for the single-dimensional setting. For a more thorough
overview we refer to the recent review article of Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen [47] and the
textbook of Hartline [32].
Related to this, and placed under the general theme of what has come to be known as
“Wilson’s doctrine” [53] (see also [40, Section 5.2]), there has also been significant effort towards
1In such mechanisms it is to the buyers’ best interest to honestly report their actual private valuation when
bidding. For formal definitions, see Section 2.1. We notice here that this is essentially without loss to the revenue
maximization objective, due to the Revelation Principle (see, e.g., [46]).
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the direction of robust revenue maximization: designing auctions that make as few assumptions
as possible on the seller’s prior knowledge about the bidders’ valuations for the items. Examples
include models where the auctioneer has only sample access to the distribution [21, 24, 27, 34,
42, 51], can perform quantile queries [17] or knows some estimate of the actual prior [6, 10, 37].
Another line of work studies robustness with respect to the correlation of valuations across
bidders or items [5, 14, 28].
Most relevant to our work in the present paper is the model of parametric auctions, intro-
duced by Azar and Micali [1]. More specifically, they study single-dimensional (digital goods
and single-item) auction settings with independent item valuations, under the assumption that
the seller has only access to the mean µi and the variance σ2i of each buyer’s i prior distribution.
Using Chebyshev-like tail bounds, they show that for the special single-bidder, single-item case,
deterministically pricing at a multiple of the standard deviation below the mean, i.e. offering
a take-it-or-leave-it price of µ− k · σ, guarantees an approximation ratio of ρ˜(σ/µ), where ρ˜ is
an increasing function taking values in [1,∞). In Appendix C, we actually quantify this bound
and show that it grows quadratically. Under an extra assumption of Monotone Hazard Rate
(MHR), they show how the even simpler selling mechanism that just prices at µ achieves an
approximation ratio of e.
It is interesting to notice here that Azar and Micali [1] provide an exact solution, for deter-
ministic mechanisms, to the robust optimization problem of maximizing the expected revenue.
Then, they use this maximin revenue-optimal mechanism and compare it to the optimal social
welfare (which is trivially also an upper bound on the optimal revenue), to finally derive their
upper bound guarantee on the approximation ratio of revenue. As such, their results are not
tailored to be tight for the ratio benchmark. As a matter of fact, in [3] the authors also provide
an explicit lower bound that can be written as 1 + r2. This is an important motivating factor
for our work, since one of our main goals in this paper is to close these gaps and provide tight
approximation ratio bounds.
Azar et al. [2] use a clever reduction (see also the work of Chawla et al. [16]) to show how these
results can be paired with the work of Dhangwatnotai et al. [24] regarding the VCG mechanism
with reserves, in order to design parametric auctions for very general single-dimensional settings.
In particular, they show how in matroid-constrained environments with the extra assumption of
regularity on the prior distributions (or MHR for more general downward-closed environments),
using the aforementioned parametric prices as lazy reserves guarantees a 2ρ˜(r)-approximation
to the optimal (Myersonian) revenue and a ρ˜(r)-approximation to the optimal social welfare.
Here r = maxi σi/µi.
Another work which is close to ours is that of Carrasco et al. [13]. The authors essentially
extend the model of Azar and Micali [1] to randomized mechanisms, solving the maximin
robust optimization problem with respect to revenue. Again, in principle their results cannot
be immediately translated to tight bounds for the approximation ratio; however, unlike the
deterministic case for which in the present paper we have to design a new mechanism in order
to achieve ratio optimality, we will show that the maximin optimal lottery of Carrasco et al.
[13] is actually also optimal for the ratio benchmark.
1.2 Results and Techniques
The main focus of our paper is a multi-dimensional auction setting where a single bidder has
additive valuations for m items, drawn from a joint probability distribution F . We make no
further assumptions on F ; in particular, we do not require F to be a product distribution nor
do we enforce any kind of regularity. The seller knows only the mean µj and (an upper bound
on) the standard deviation σj of each item’s j marginal distribution. Based on this limited
statistical information, they are asked to fix a truthful (possibly randomized) mechanism to
sell the items. Then, an adversary chooses the actual distribution F (respecting, of course, the
statistical (µj , σj)-information) and the seller realizes the expected revenue of the auction, in
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the standard Bayesian way, in expectation with respect to F . The main quantity of interest,
which we call the robust approximation ratio is the ratio of the optimal revenue (which has full
knowledge of F in advance) to this revenue.
Our worst-case, min-max approach is similar in spirit to the previous work of Azar et al.
[2], Azar and Micali [3] and Carrasco et al. [13]. However, the critical difference in the present
paper is that our main goal is to optimize the ratio against the optimal revenue and not just
the expected revenue of the selling mechanism on its own. It turns out that, similarly to the
aforementioned previous work, our bounds can be stated with respect to the ratio rj = σj/µj ,
which is an important statistical quantity called the coefficient of variation2 (CV), of each item’s
marginal distribution.
In Section 2 we formally introduce our model and necessary notation. In the following
two sections we focus on the single-item case, since this will be the building block for all our
results. In particular, in Section 3 we show that the robust approximation ratio of deterministic
mechanisms is exactly ρD(r) ≈ 1 + 4r2 (see Definition 1), closing a gap open from the work
of Azar and Micali [3]. Similarly to previous work, in order to achieve this we solve exactly the
corresponding min-max problem (see Lemma 2); however, the method and the solution itself
have to be different, since we are dealing with the ratio, which is a more “sensitive” quantity
than the revenue on its own.
Next, in Section 4 we deal with general randomized auctions and we show (Theorem 2) that
a lottery proposed by Carrasco et al. [13], which we term log-lottery, although designed for a
different objective, achieves an approximation ratio of ρ(r) ≈ 1 + ln(1 + r2) (see Definition 1)
in our setting, which is asymptotically optimal. The construction of the lower bound instance
(Theorem 3) is arguably the most technically challenging part of our paper, and is based on a
novel utilization of Yao’s minimax principle (see also Appendix D) that might be of independent
interest for deriving robust approximation lower bounds in other Bayesian mechanism design
settings as well. Informally, the adversary offers a distribution over two-point mass distribu-
tions, finely-tuned such that the resulting mixture becomes a truncated “equal-revenue style”
distribution (see Fig. 2c).
Is is important to restate that we work under the assumption that we know an upper bound on
the standard-deviation σ and not its exact value. Although this makes our upper bounds more
powerful, it is not a source of “artificial” additional power for the adversary when designing
our lower bounds. We formalize this in Lemma 5. Furthermore, this helps us to formally
demonstrate (see Proposition 2) that our aforementioned, Yao-based, lower bound construction
lies at the “border of simplicity” of any non-trivial lower bound.
In Section 5 we demonstrate how the O(log r)-approximate mechanism of the single-item
case can be utilized to provide optimal approximation ratios for the multi-dimensional case
of m items as well. More specifically, we show that selling each item j separately using the
log-lottery guarantees an approximation ratio of ρ(rmax) where rmax = maxj rj is the maximum
CV across the items. If the seller has extra information that item valuations are independent
(that is, F is a product distribution), then switching to a lottery that offers all items in a single
full bundle can give an improved approximation ratio of ρ(r¯), where r¯ =
√∑
j σ
2
j /
∑
j µj is the
CV of the average valuation. We complement these upper bounds by tight lower bounds in
Theorem 5; these constructions have at their core the single-item lower bound, but they take
care of delicately assigning valuations to the remaining items so that they respect independence
and the common prior statistical information. An interesting corollary of our upper bounds
(Corollary 1) is that for the special case of independent valuations with the same mean and
variance, the approximation ratio is at most ρ
(
σ
µ
√
m
)
, converging to optimality as the number
of items grows large.
2This is essentially a “unit-independent” measure of the dispersion of the distribution. See, e.g., Moriguti [43]
or Kendall [35, Sec. 2.21].
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In Section 6.1 we diverge from our main model to discuss some additional “peripheral”
results that can be deduced as direct corollaries of previous work combined with our upper
bounds, in a “black-box” way. First, we study the single-dimensional, multi-bidder setting of
parametric auctions introduced by Azar and Micali [3]. More specifically, we show how the
positive results derived in Azar et al. [2, Theorem 4.3] can be further improved: running VCG
with lazy reserve prices drawn from the log-lottery guarantees a 2ρ(r) approximation to the
optimal Myersonian revenue (Corollary 2).
Secondly, in Section 6.2 we discuss how a relaxation of our model that only assumes knowl-
edge of the mean (that is, without any information about the variance σ2) can still produce good
robust approximation ratios under an extra regularity assumption. More precisely, in Propo-
sition 3 we give an upper bound on the approximation ratio of the mechanism that just offers
the mean µ as a take-it-or-leave-it price, under the extra assumption that the item’s valuation
distribution is λ-regular (see Fig. 3a); this is a general notion of regularity that interpolates
smoothly between regularity à la Myerson (λ = 1) and the Monotone Hazard Rate (MHR) con-
dition (λ = 0); see, e.g., [26, 50]. This result extends the e-approximation for MHR distributions
of Azar and Micali [1, Theorem 3]. In Section 6.2 we provide a more detailed characterization
of the relationship between the knowledge of λ-regularity and knowledge of σ, with respect to
the resulting robust approximation ratio upper bound (see Fig. 3b).
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Model and Notation
A real nonnegative random variable will be called (µ, σ)-distributed if its expectation is µ and
its standard deviation is at most σ. We let Fµ,σ denote the class of (µ, σ) distributions. We
shall also briefly (see Lemma 5) discuss the restriction to distributions with standard deviation
of exactly σ; this subclass will be denoted by F=µ,σ.
For the most part of this paper we study auctions with m items and a single additive bidder,
whose valuations (v1, . . . , vm) for the items are drawn from a joint distribution F over Rm≥0. We
denote the marginal distribution of vj by Fj , and assume that it has finite mean and variance.
In general, we make no further assumptions for F ; in particular, we do not assume independence
of the random variables v1, . . . , vm nor do we enforce any regularity or continuity assumption.
For vectors ~µ = (µ1, . . . , µn) ∈ Rm>0, ~σ = (σ1, . . . , σm) ∈ Rm≥0 we denote by F~µ,~σ the class of all
m-dimensional distributions whose j-th marginal is (µj , σj)-distributed, for all j = 1, . . . ,m.
A (direct revelation, possibly randomized) selling mechanism for a single bidder andm items
is defined by a pair (x, pi) where x : Rm≥0 → [0, 1]m is the allocation rule and pi : Rm≥0 → R≥0 is
the payment rule. If the buyer submits as bid a valuation vector of ~v, then they receive each
item i with probability xi(~v), and are charged (a total of) pi(~v). We restrict our study to truthful
mechanisms, which are characterized by the conditions
x(~v) · ~v − pi(~v) ≥ x(~w) · ~v − pi(~w) for all ~v, ~w; (1)
x(~v) · ~v − pi(~v) ≥ 0 for all ~v. (2)
Informally, the first condition states that the bidder can not be “better off” by misreporting
their true valuation; the second condition, known as individual rationality, ensures that the
bidder cannot harm themselves by truthfully participating in the mechanism.
Let Am denote the space of all truthful selling mechanisms. Then, given an m-dimensional
distribution F , we denote by
• REV(A;F ) = E~v∼F [pi(~v)], the expected revenue of A (the expectation is taken w.r.t. F );
• WEL(A;F ) = E~v∼F [x(~v) · ~v], the expected welfare of A;
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• OPT(F ) = supA∈Am REV(A;F ), the optimum revenue;
• VAL(F ) = supA∈Am WEL(A;F ), the optimum welfare. By definition, this is also the
welfare of a VCG auction; moreover, for a single additive bidder with a joint distribution
in F~µ,~σ, this is just the sum of the marginal expectations, VAL(F ) =
∑m
j=1 µj .
Note that, due to (2), we immediately have the so-called welfare bounds for the above quantities:
for any mechanism and distribution,
REV(A;F ) ≤WEL(A;F ) and OPT(F ) ≤ VAL(F ).
Our goal in this paper is to quantify the following benchmark
APX(~µ, ~σ) = inf
A∈Am
sup
F∈F~µ,~σ
OPT(F )
REV(A;F ) , (3)
which we call the robust approximation ratio. The semantics are the following: a seller chooses
the best (revenue-maximizing) selling mechanism A, given only knowledge of the means ~µ and
standard deviations ~σ and then an adversary (“nature”) responds by choosing a worst-case
“valid” distribution that respects the statistical information ~µ and ~σ. At some parts of our
paper, we restrict our attention to deterministic mechanisms A; that is, mechanisms whose
allocation rule satisfies x(~v) ∈ {0, 1}, for all ~v. Under this additional constraint, the quantity
in (3) will be denoted by DAPX(~µ, ~σ).
For the special case of a single item (m = 1), we know from the seminal work of Myerson [45]
that an auction A ∈ A1 is truthful if and only if its allocation rule is monotone nondecreasing
and the payment rule is given by pi(v) = v · x(v) − ∫ v0 x(z) dz. In particular, this implies that
every deterministic mechanism A ∈ A1 is completely determined by a single take-it-or-leave-it
price p ≥ 0; thus, we will feel free to sometimes abuse notation and write REV(p;F ) instead of
REV(A;F ) if A is the deterministic auction that sells at price p.
Most importantly for our work, every randomized auction for a single item can be seen as a
nonnegative random variable over prices (see Carrasco et al. [13, Footnote 10]). In particular,
since the allocation rule is monotone and takes values in [0, 1], it can be interpreted as the
cumulative distribution of a certain randomization over prices, which assigns the item with the
same probability as the original mechanism.3 In this way, for a randomized single-item auction
we can abuse notation and write p ∼ A to denote that a price p is sampled according to A. In
this way, REV(A;F ) = Ep∼A[REV(p;F )].
Finally, from Myerson [45] we also know that for single-item settings the optimum revenue
can always be achieved by a deterministic mechanism, that is,
OPT(F ) = sup
p≥0
REV(p;F ) = sup
p≥0
p · (1− F (p−)) (4)
where we use F (·) for the cumulative function (cdf) of distribution F and F (p−) = Pr [X < p] =
limx→p− F (x), where X ∼ F . We shall call OPT(·) the Myerson operator and for now we simply
observe that this is a functional mapping distributions to real nonnegative numbers.
2.2 Auxiliary Functions and Distributions
To state our bounds, it will be convenient to define the following auxiliary functions:
3There are only two subtle technical issues that need to be taken into account; x need not be right-continuous,
and limv→∞ x(v) need not equal 1; we can assume these without loss of generality. Otherwise, one could take
the right-continuous closure of x, and either assign the remainder probability to high prices, or apply a suitable
scaling, which would only increase expected revenue.
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Figure 1: The robust approximation ratio for deterministic (left) and randomized (right, blue) selling mechanisms
for a single (µ, σ)-distributed item, for small values of the coefficient of variation r = σ/µ. The former is tight
and given in Theorem 1. The latter is the upper bound given by Theorem 2; it is asymptotically matching the
lower bound (red) of Theorem 3.
Definition 1 (Functions ρD, ρ). For any r ≥ 0, let ρD(r) = ρ, resp. ρ(r) = ρ, be the unique
positive solution of equation
(ρ− 1)3
(2ρ− 1)2 = r
2, resp. 1
ρ2
(
2eρ−1 − 1
)
= r2 + 1.
Plots of these functions, for small values of r, can be seen in Fig. 1. Their asymptotic
behaviour is given in the following two lemmas, whose proofs are deferred to Appendix A.
Lemma 1. For the functions ρD, ρ defined in Definition 1, we have the bounds and asymptotics,
1 + 4r2 ≤ ρD(r) ≤ 2 + 4r2 for all r ≥ 0; ρ(r) = 1 + (1 + o(1)) ln(1 + r2).
We also define a specific random variable, which corresponds to the prices of the lottery
proposed by Carrasco et al. [13, Prop. 4]:
Definition 2 (Log-Lottery). Fix any µ > 0 and σ ≥ 0. A log-lottery, denoted by P logµ,σ, is a
random variable distributed over the nonnegative interval support [pi1, pi2] according to the cdf
F logµ,σ(x) =
pi2 ln xpi1 − (x− pi1)
pi2 ln pi2pi1 − (pi2 − pi1)
,
where parameters pi1, pi2 are the (unique) solutions of the system pi1
(
1 + ln pi2
pi1
)
= µ (5a)
pi1(2pi2 − pi1) = µ2 + σ2. (5b)
3 Single Item: Deterministic Pricing
In this section we begin our study of robust revenue maximization by looking at the simplest
case: one item and deterministic pricing rules. Note that Azar and Micali [3] already established
a lower bound of 1 + r2 for this setting, together with an upper bound which can be shown
to be 1 +
(
27
4 + o(1)
)
r2 (they actually characterized the upper bound via the solution of a
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cubic equation; we provide the exact asymptotics of that solution in Appendix C). Our result
(Theorem 1) is a refined analysis that captures the exact robustness ratio (and in particular the
“correct” constant in the quadratic term).
Our first observation (Lemma 2) will be that the worst-case adversarial response (for a
specific selling price) can be characterized in terms of a two-point mass distribution, which
allows the problem to be solved exactly. These type of distributions have appeared already in
the results of Azar and Micali [1] and Carrasco et al. [13], and we will start by introducing some
notation to reason about them.
A two-point mass distribution F takes some value x with probability α and some value y
with probability 1 − α, where without loss x < y. When the distribution is constrained to
have mean µ and variance exactly equal to σ2, only one free parameter remains, i.e. F can
be characterized by the position x of its first point mass. The other two parameters can be
obtained as
y(x) = µ+
σ2
µ− x and α(x) =
σ2
σ2 + (µ− x)2,
by solving the first and second moment conditions µ = αx+(1−α)y and µ2+σ2 = αx2+(1−α)y2.
For the remainder, we let Fx, x ∈ [0, µ), denote this distribution. Note that the limiting case
x→ µ corresponds to α(x)→ 1 and y(x)→∞, meaning that Fx weakly converges to µ.
The next result solves the innermost optimization problem in (3), i.e. it characterizes the
worst-case adversarial response against a specific deterministic pricing.
Lemma 2. For any choice of mean µ and variance σ2, and any deterministic pricing scheme,
the worst-case robust approximation ratio is achieved over a limiting two-point mass distribution.
Formally, for any µ, σ, p,
1. if p > µ, then the worst-case response corresponds to playing Fx with x→ µ−, and
sup
F∈Fµ,σ
OPT(F )
REV(p;F ) =∞;
2. if 0 < p < µ, then the worst-case response corresponds to playing Fx with x→ p−, and
sup
F∈Fµ,σ
OPT(F )
REV(p;F ) = max
{
1 + σ
2
(µ− p)2 ,
µ
p
+ σ
2
p(µ− p)
}
.
Proof. If p > µ, then the worst-case robust approximation ratio can become arbitrarily large
by taking x → µ−, that is, x arbitrarily close to µ, so that α(x) → 1. Indeed, we have that
REV(p;Fx) ≤ p(1− α(x))→ 0, whereas OPT(Fx) ≥ x→ µ, so that the supremum of the ratio
is unbounded.
Next, let us suppose that 0 < p < µ. First, we compute the limit of the approximation
ratio for distribution Fx, as x → p−. Observe that OPT(Fx) = max{x, (1 − α(x))y(x)}; and
since x < p, we sell the item with probability 1 − α(x), to obtain REV(p;Fx) = p(1 − α(x)).
Therefore,
lim
x→p−
OPT(Fx)
REV(p, Fx)
= lim
x→p−
max{x, (1− α(x))y(x)}
p(1− α(x))
= max
{ 1
1− α(p) ,
y(p)
p
}
= max
{
1 + σ
2
(µ− p)2 ,
µ
p
+ σ
2
p(µ− p)
}
.
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Thus, it only remains to show that for any random variable X drawn from a (µ, σ) distribution
F , we have that
OPT(F )
REV(p;F ) ≤ max
{ 1
1− α(p) ,
y(p)
p
}
.
We first derive a lower bound on the probability of selling the item at price p via a one-sided
version of Chebyshev’s inequality, also called Cantelli’s inequality4 (see, e.g., [8, p. 46]),
Pr[X ≥ p] = Pr[X − µ ≥ −(µ− p)] ≥ 1− σ
2
σ2 + (µ− p)2 = 1− α(p). (6)
Let p∗ denote the optimal take-it-or-leave-it price for distribution F , so that OPT(F ) =
p∗ Pr[x ≥ p∗]. Again, we consider two cases: if p∗ ≤ p, then we have
OPT(F )
REV(p, F ) =
p∗ Pr[X ≥ p∗]
pPr[X ≥ p] ≤
1
1− α(p) ≤ max
{ 1
1− α(p) ,
y(p)
p
}
where in the first inequality we used (6) and the bounds p∗ ≤ p, Pr[X ≥ p∗] ≤ 1.
Next, consider the case p∗ > p. By looking at the conditional random variable (X|X ≥ p),
we observe that
p∗ Pr[X ≥ p∗]
Pr[X ≥ p] = p
∗ Pr [X ≥ p∗|X ≥ p] = REV(p∗;F |X ≥ p) ≤ E [X|X ≥ p] ; (7)
the inequality holds because the social welfare is always an upper bound to the revenue.
In order to bound the conditional expectation, we use a result in Mallows and Richter [38,
Eq. (1.2)]. It states that if X is a real-valued random variable with mean µ and variance σ2
and E is a non-zero probability event, then
E[X | E]− µ ≤ σ
√
1− Pr[E]
Pr[E] .
In our case, we use E = (X ≥ p), together with the lower bound in (6), to get
E [X|X ≥ p] ≤ µ+ σ
√
1
Pr[X ≥ p] − 1 ≤ µ+ σ
√
1
1− α(p)− 1 = µ+
σ2
µ− p = y(p).
Finally, combining the above with (7) yields
OPT(F )
REV(p, F ) =
p∗ Pr[X ≥ p∗]
pPr[X ≥ p] ≤
E [X|X ≥ p]
p
≤ y(p)
p
≤ max
{ 1
1− α(p) ,
y(p)
p
}
,
which concludes the proof.
Theorem 1. The deterministic robust approximation ratio of selling a single (µ, σ)-distributed
item is exactly equal to
DAPX(µ, σ) = ρD(r) ≈ 1 + 4 · r2,
where r = σ/µ and function ρD(·) is given in Definition 1. In particular, this is achieved by
offering a take-it-or-leave-it price of p = ρD(r)2ρD(r)−1 · µ.
4Although the original statement of Cantelli’s inequality is for a random variable with variance equal to σ2,
by monotonicity the same holds if σ2 is instead an upper bound on the variance.
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Proof. For fixed µ and σ, Lemma 2 gives the worst-case approximation ratio for any choice of
p. Thus, from the seller’s perspective, it is clear that one should offer a price below the mean,
and furthermore the outermost optimization problem reduces to finding
ρ = inf
0<p<µ
max
{
1 + σ
2
(µ− p)2 ,
µ
p
+ σ
2
p(µ− p)
}
.
In Lemma 6 (see Appendix A), we prove that this quantity is minimized when both branches
coincide; that it corresponds to the unique positive solution of the equation
(ρ− 1)3
(2ρ− 1)2 =
(
σ
µ
)2
;
the desired asymptotics; and also the characterization of the selling price p in terms of ρ.
4 Single Item: Lotteries
In this section, we continue to focus on a single-item setting, but now we study the robust
approximation ratio that can be achieved by a randomized mechanism, i.e. by randomizing over
posted prices. Carrasco et al. [13] have given the explicit solution to the robust absolute revenue
problem,
sup
A∈A1
inf
F∈Fµ,σ
REV(A;F ). (8)
We state below a proposition that can be directly derived from their work and which would be
very useful for our setting (the detailed derivation can be found in Appendix B)
Proposition 1. For µ > 0, σ ≥ 0, the value of the maximin problem (8) is given by
sup
A∈A1
inf
F∈Fµ,σ
REV(A;F ) = pi1,
where pi1 is derived by the unique solution of the system (5a)-(5b). Moreover, this value is
achieved by the log-lottery P logµ,σ described in Definition 2.
The above characterization can be directly used to derive a logarithmic upper bound on the
robust approximation ratio:
Theorem 2. The robust approximation ratio of selling a single (µ, σ)-distributed item is at
most
APX(µ, σ) ≤ ρ(r) ≈ 1 + ln(1 + r2),
where r = σ/µ and function ρ is given in Definition 1. In particular, this is achieved by the
log-lottery described in Definition 2.
Proof. By Proposition 1, if A is the log-lottery from Definition 2, then for any (µ, σ) distribution
F we have that REV(A;F ) ≥ pi1. Thus, using the trivial upper bound of OPT(F ) ≤ µ for
the optimal revenue, we can derive an upper bound of µpi1 on the approximation ratio. For
convenience, let us denote this by ρ ≡ µ/pi1.
Manipulating (5a) we get
pi1
(
1 + ln pi2
pi1
)
= µ ⇐⇒ ln pi2
pi1
= µ
pi1
− 1 ⇐⇒ pi2
pi1
= eρ−1
and so from (5b) we can derive
pi1(2pi2 − pi1) = µ2 + σ2 ⇐⇒ pi
2
1
µ2
(
2pi2
pi1
− 1
)
= σ
2
µ2
+ 1 ⇐⇒ 1
ρ2
(
2eρ−1 − 1
)
= r2 + 1,
which is exactly the equation in Definition 1. The asymptotic behaviour follows from Lemma 1.
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By looking at the proof of the previous theorem, it is not difficult to see that our upper
bound is also an upper bound with respect to welfare (which for a single (µ, σ) distribution
is simply given by µ). If we were interested in comparing the revenue of our auction to the
maximum welfare, then it immediately follows from Proposition 1 that the bound is exact and
tight. However, our main goal in the present paper is to provide tight bounds with respect
to the optimal revenue, and achieving this requires some extra work. The rest of our section
is devoted to proving and discussing the following lower bound, which asymptotically matches
that of Theorem 2.
Theorem 3. For a single (µ, σ)-distributed item, the robust approximation ratio is at least
APX(µ, σ) ≥ 1 + ln(1 + r2),
where r = σ/µ.
Before we go into the actual construction of our lower bound instances, we need some
technical preliminaries and to recall Yao’s principle (see, e.g., [7, Sec. 8.3] or [44, Sec. 2.2.2]).
As we already mentioned (see Section 2.1), a randomized mechanism A ∈ A1 can be interpreted
as a randomization over prices p ∼ A. From (3), we are interested in the value of a game in
which the mechanism designer plays first, randomizing over posted prices, and the adversary
plays second, choosing a worst-case distribution. Intuitively, Yao’s principle states that this is
at least the value of another game in which the adversary plays first, randomizing over their
choices, and the mechanism designer plays second, choosing a deterministic response, i.e. a
single posted price.
However, to define this second game formally, we would have to first explain what it means
for the adversary to randomize over probability distributions, which form an infinite-dimensional
space. Informally, this corresponds to a space of “distributions over distributions”; but in order
to avoid technical or measure-theoretical issues, we focus on a specific model of randomization,
which in the literature gives rise to the concept of mixture or contagious distribution (see,
e.g.,Mood et al. [41, Ch. III.4].
Definition 3. Let F be a class of cumulative distribution functions over the nonnegative reals,
and consider any measure space over a ground set T . By an F-mixture with parameter space T ,
we mean a pair (Θ,F ), where Θ is a probability measure in T , and F is a measurable function
of type F : R≥0 × T → R, whose sections are in F; i.e. for any parameter θ ∈ T , the function
Fθ : R≥0 → R, Fθ(x) = F (x; θ),
is a cumulative distribution in F.
Given an F-mixture (Θ,F ), we denote its posterior distribution by Eθ∼Θ[Fθ]; this is specified
by the cdf
E
θ∼Θ
[Fθ](z) =
∫
F (z; θ)dΘ(θ) = E
θ∼Θ
[Fθ(z)].
When F = Fµ,σ is the class of (µ, σ) distributions, we shall let ∆µ,σ denote the class of (µ, σ)
mixtures, that is, the class of mixtures over Fµ,σ (with arbitrary, unspecified parameter space).
We can interpret (Θ,F ) as a convex combination of distributions, so that the cdf of Eθ∼Θ[Fθ] is
the convex combination of the corresponding cdfs; alternatively, Eθ∼Θ[F ] can be seen as the cdf
of a random variable that first samples a distribution Fθ according to θ ∼ Θ, and then samples
a value z according to Fθ.
Now that we have carefully described the adversarial model, we can formally state a version
of Yao’s principle (Lemma 3 below) that will help us prove lower bounds. Since this applies
on “non-standard” continuous spaces, for completeness we need to formally derive it “from
scratch”; we give such a self-contained proof in Appendix D.
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Lemma 3. For any µ, σ, we have the following lower bound on the robust approximation ratio,
inf
A∈A1
sup
F∈Fµ,σ
OPT(F )
REV(A;F ) ≥ sup(Θ,F )∈∆µ,σ
inf
p≥0
Eθ∼Θ[OPT(Fθ)]
Eθ∼Θ[REV(p;Fθ)]
.
Note that, by using (4), we can rewrite the denominator of the previous quantity as follows:
sup
p≥0
E
θ∼Θ
[REV(p;Fθ)] = sup
p≥0
E
θ∼Θ
[p(1− Fθ(p−))]
= sup
p≥0
p
(
1− E
θ∼Θ
[Fθ(p−)]
)
= sup
p≥0
p
(
1− E
θ∼Θ
[Fθ](p−)
)
= OPT
(
E
θ∼Θ
[Fθ]
)
.
The second equality comes from linearity of expectation and the third one follows from the
definition of a mixture distribution. Putting all these together, we arrive at the following key
technical result:
Lemma 4. For any µ, σ, the robust approximation ratio is lower bounded by
APX(µ, σ) ≥ sup
(Θ,F )∈∆µ,σ
Eθ∼Θ[OPT(Fθ)]
OPT(Eθ∼Θ[Fθ])
. (9)
From a practical perspective, the above result has a positive consequence. It allows us to
obtain lower bounds by constructing a single (µ, σ) mixture, (Θ,F ), and calculating the expected
optimal revenue before and after the realization of θ ∼ Θ. From a theoretical perspective, the
quantity in (9) is interesting by itself. One can check that the Myerson operator is convex,
that is, the revenue achieved by a convex combination of distributions can only be smaller
than the convex combinations of the corresponding revenues. Thus, by Jensen’s inequality, the
ratio in (9) is always at least 1. On the other hand, for a linear functional L, we have that
Eθ∼Θ[L(Fθ)] = L(Eθ∼Θ[Fθ]). Thus, (9) somehow attempts to quantify the extent to which OPT
is nonlinear, or in other words, it can be understood as a measure of convexity of the Myerson
operator. In any case, we can use this result to construct lower bound instances and prove the
main result of this section:
Proof of Theorem 3. We shall construct a (µ, σ) mixture over two-point mass distributions.
Each two-point mass distribution Fε is given by a unique choice of parameter ε ∈ (0, 1]; Fε
returns 0 with probability 1 − ε and µ/ε with probability ε. Note that Fε has mean µ and
variance µ2(1/ε − 1). The upper bound of σ2 on the variance implies that we can only take
values of ε ≥ ε0 ≡ 11+r2 , where r is the coefficient of variation (our quantity of interest).
Our next step is to describe the convex mixture of these distributions. Define a random
variable with [ε0, 1] and distributed according to B as follows:
• B has a point mass at ε0 of size c;
• B is continuous over (ε0, 1], with density β(ε) = c/ε.
The value of c is given by c = 11+ln(1+r2) and is chosen as a normalizing constant; indeed,
1 = E
ε∼B
[1] = c+ c ln 1
ε0
= c
(
1 + ln
(
1 + r2
))
.
Our (µ, σ) mixture distribution thus corresponds to sampling Fε where ε ∼ B. Next, we
describe the posterior distribution G = Eε∼B[Fε]. Its cumulative function can be seen in Fig. 2c.
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zFε(z)
0 µ µ/ε
1
1− ε
(a) Two-point mass distribution
with one mass at 0 and another at
µ/ε.
ε
B(ε)
0 ε0 1
1
c
(b) Mixing in parameter space;
each ε corresponds to a two-point
mass distribution as in Fig. 2a.
Note that this distribution has a
mass at ε0.
z
G(z)
0 µ µ/ε0
1
1− c
1− cε0
(c) Posterior distribution from the
mixture obtained via Figs. 2a
and 2b.
Figure 2: The cdfs of the various distributions used in the lower bound construction of Theorem 3.
• Mass at 0: as each Fε has a point mass at 0, so does G. The value of this mass is given
by
E
ε∼B
[mass of Fε at 0] =
∫ 1
ε0
(1− ε)β(ε)dε+ (1− ε0)c = c ln 1
ε0
= 1− c;
• Mass at µ/ε0: as B has a point mass at ε0 and Fε0 has a point mass at µ/ε0, this implies
that G has a point mass at µ/ε0 of size cε0;
• cdf in [µ, µ/ε0): for each z ∈ [µ, µ/ε0), Fε(z) is (1− ε) for ε < µ/z and 1 for ε ≥ µ/z; thus
the cdf of G can be computed as
G(z) =
∫ µ/z
ε0
(1− ε)β(ε)dε+
∫ 1
µ/z
β(ε)dε+ (1− ε0)c = 1− cµ
z
.
We can interpret G(z) as a truncated equal-revenue distribution over the interval [µ, µ/ε0), with
additional point masses at 0 and µ/ε0. In particular, every posted price in [µ, µ/ε] yields the
same (optimal) revenue, and OPT(G) = cµ = µ1+ln(1+r2) . On the other hand, note that for
every ε > 0 we have OPT(Fε) = µ, so Eε∼B[OPT(Fε)] = µ. Plugging these into (9) yields a
lower bound of 1/c = 1 + ln(1 + r2) as desired.
From the previous proof, some further discussion and remarks are in order. Note that our
mixture uses distributions Fε, which for ε > ε0 have a variance strictly smaller than σ2. Since
we have defined our adversarial model to play (µ, σ) distributions, such instances are allowed.
However, one may wish to ensure that the adversary only picks distributions in F=µ,σ (i.e. with
exact equality on the variance); this might be relevant, for example, if the seller had extra
information about the exact value of σ; or, from a theoretical perspective, such a restriction
of the adversary would only make our lower bound more “clear” and powerful. We shall now
argue that indeed our assumption on having just a bound on the standard deviation, is not only
a technical convenience (and, arguably, more realistic), but also is without loss of generality for
our bounds. Intuitively, for any mechanism A and any (µ, σ) distribution F , one can “perturb”
F into a distribution in F=µ,σ having nearly the same approximation ratio. Below we formalize
this intuition for single-item settings, although it is not hard to see how to generalize it to higher
dimensions.
Lemma 5. For single-item settings, the restriction of the robust approximation problem from
(µ, σ) distributions to distributions in F=µ,σ does not change its value. Formally, for any µ > 0,
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σ ≥ 0, and any mechanism A, we have
sup
F∈Fµ,σ
OPT(F )
REV(A;F ) = supF∈F=µ,σ
OPT(F )
REV(A;F ) ;
and hence
inf
A∈A1
sup
F∈Fµ,σ
OPT(F )
REV(A;F ) = infA∈A1
sup
F∈F=µ,σ
OPT(F )
REV(A;F ) .
Proof. Let µ and σ be given, and let A be any mechanism and F0 any (µ, σ) distribution.
Suppose that the variance of F0 is σ˜2 < σ2. For each δ ∈ (0, 1], let us define the perturbed
distribution Fδ as the following convex combination of distributions:
• with probability 1− δ, sample a value according to F0;
• with probability δ, sample a value according to the rare event distribution that is 0 with
probability 1− ε and µ/ε with probability ε;
• the value of ε is chosen so that Fδ has variance exactly equal to σ2; in other words, it is
obtained by solving the system
(1− δ)(µ2 + σ˜2) + δµ2/ε = µ2 + σ2 =⇒ ε = δµ
2
δµ2 + σ2 − (1− δ)σ˜2 .
Note that, for each δ, Fδ has the desired mean of µ as it is the convex combination of two
distributions of mean µ. Moreover, as δ → 0, also ε → 0, so that Fδ weakly converges to F0.
Finally, we have the trivial bounds
REV(A;Fδ) ≤ (1− δ)REV(A;F0) + δµ; OPT(Fδ) ≥ (1− δ)OPT(F0),
which can be combined to yield
OPT(Fδ)
REV(A;Fδ)
≥ (1− δ)OPT(F0)(1− δ)REV(A;F0) + δµ.
By letting δ go to 0, we have
sup
F∈F=µ,σ
OPT(F )
REV(A;F ) ≥ limδ→0
(1− δ)OPT(F0)
(1− δ)REV(A;F0) + δµ =
OPT(F0)
REV(A;F0)
.
Taking suprema over F0 on the right-hand side yields the first statement of our lemma; and
taking infima over A on both sides yields the last statement.
It should also be mentioned that, in principle, we could accommodate the proof of Theorem 3
to handle distributions with exact equality with respect to σ, with minor technical modifications.
More precisely, one would define Fε,δ as a perturbation of Fε as in the proof of Lemma 5. This
would yield an approximation ratio that depends on δ, which would then be taken in the limit
δ → 0.
Another observation is that the “bad instances” that we used for Theorem 3 were two-point
mass distributions, with one of the points being 0. Note that these differ from the instances
we used in the deterministic lower bounds (Lemma 2, Theorem 1), which were two-point mass
distributions with exact variance of σ2. These latter instances were actually shown in [13] to
be worst-case distributions for their objective function, and they were also used in Azar and
Micali [3] to prove maximin optimality in their model. Thus, it would be natural to wonder
whether such instances could have been actually enough to prove a matching lower bound in the
randomized setting. Below we answer this question in the negative; in other words, we prove a
constant upper bound when the adversary is forced to pick one of these distributions.
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Proposition 2. For every choice of µ, σ, there is a randomized mechanism A that achieves (at
least) a 14 -fraction of the optimal revenue on any distribution F that is a two-point mass with
mean µ and variance σ2. In particular, A is the mechanism that offers price 12µ with probability
1
2 and µ+ 2
σ2
µ with probability
1
2 .
Proof. Let us analyse the performance of A on a two-point mass distribution Fx, say with a
point mass at x of size α(x) and another at y(x) of size 1 − α(x), with x < µ < y(x). If
1
2µ ≤ x then, as before, the mechanism chooses with probability 1/2 a price that always sells,
guaranteeing revenue of µ4 . Finally, suppose that x ≤ 12µ. This implies
y(x) = µ+ σ
2
µ− x ≥ µ+ 2
σ2
µ
, 1− α(x) = (µ− x)
2
σ2 + (µ− x)2 ≥
1
4µ
2
σ2 + 14µ2
.
Our mechanism A chooses with probability 1/2 a price of µ+2σ2µ , which sells with probability
1− α(x). Thus the revenue achieved is at least
1
2 (1− α(x))
(
µ+ 2σ
2
µ
)
≥ 12
1
4µ
2
σ2 + 14µ2
µ2 + 2σ2
µ
= µ4
σ2 + 12µ2
σ2 + 14µ2
>
µ
4 ;
so that the mechanism achieves a 1/4-fraction of OPT(F ) in this case as well.
5 Multiple Items
In this section we finally consider the more general setting of a single additive buyer with
valuations for m items. As it turns out, the main tools developed in Section 4 can be leveraged
very naturally to produce similar upper and lower bounds. We begin by proving upper bounds
for both correlated and independent item valuations.
Theorem 4. The robust approximation ratio of selling m (possibly correlated) (~µ, ~σ)-distributed
items is at most
APX(~µ, ~σ) ≤ ρ(rmax), where rmax = max
j=1,...,m
rj , rj =
σj
µj
and function ρ is given in Definition 1. This is achieved by selling each item j separately using
the log-lottery P logµj ,σj from Definition 2.
Furthermore, if the items are independently distributed, the above bound improves to
APX(~µ, ~σ) ≤ ρ(r¯), where r¯ = σ¯
µ¯
, µ¯ =
m∑
j=1
µj , σ¯ =
√√√√ m∑
j=1
σ2j ,
achieved by selling the items in a single full-bundle using the log-lottery P logµ¯,σ¯ from Definition 2.
Proof. Let Xj , j = 1, . . . ,m, be (µj , σj)-distributed random variables corresponding to the
marginals of the joint m-dimensional valuation distribution F . Their sum Y = ∑mi=1Xi has an
expected value of E [Y ] = ∑mj=1 µj = µ¯ = VAL(F ). Furthermore, if X1, . . . , Xj are independent,
its variance is Var [Y ] = ∑mj=1 Var [Xj ] ≤ ∑mj=1 σ2j = σ¯2. Denote the distribution of Y by FY .
Also, recall that the optimal revenue of F cannot exceed the expected welfare, thus we have the
trivial upper bound of
OPT(F ) ≤ VAL(F ) =
m∑
j=1
µj ,
no matter if the distributions are independent or not.
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For our general upper bound first, observe that selling item j using a lottery Aj , where
Aj = P logµj ,σj is the log-lottery of Definition 2, guarantees (Theorem 2) a revenue of at least
REV(Aj ;Fj) ≥ µj
ρ(rj)
.
Thus, if A is the mechanism that sells independently each item j using Aj , we can get the
following approximation ratio upper bound for our total revenue
OPT (F )
REV(A;F ) =
OPT (F )∑m
j=1 REV(Aj ;Fj)
≤
∑m
j=1 µj∑m
j=1
µj
ρ(rj)
≤ ρ(rmax),
where the last inequality holds due to the monotonicity of ρ(·): ρ(rj) ≤ ρ(rmax) for all j.
For the case of independent valuations, observe that a feasible selling mechanism for our
items is to bundle them all together and treat them as a single item, i.e. price their sum of
valuations Y . Since Y is (µ¯, σ¯)-distributed, offering a log-lottery A = P logµ¯,σ¯ for Y results in an
approximation ratio guarantee of
APX(~µ, ~σ) ≤ OPT (F )REV(A;FY ) ≤
E [Y ]
1
ρ(r¯) E[Y ]
= ρ(r¯),
for r¯ = σ¯/µ¯.
Finally, to verify that ρ(r¯) ≤ ρ(rmax), due to the monotonicity of ρ(·) it is enough to see
that
r¯ = σ¯
µ¯
=
(∑m
j=1 σ
2
j
)1/2
µ¯
≤
∑m
j=1 σj
µ¯
=
∑m
j=1 µjrj∑m
j=1 µj
is a weighted average of r1, r2, . . . , rm, and thus at most rmax.
Corollary 1. The robust approximation revenue of selling m independently (µ, σ)-distributed
items is at most
APX(~µ, ~σ) ≤ ρ
(
r√
m
)
,
where r = σ/µ, achieved by selling the items in a single full-bundle using the mechanism given
in Theorem 2.
Proof. In the proof of Theorem 4, if X1, . . . , Xm are independent random variables with mean
µ and standard deviation at most σ, then for their sum Y we have µ¯ = m · µ and σ¯ ≤
√
mσ2 =√
mσ.
We make a few observations at this point. Notice that when moving from a single item to
many items, our approximation guarantees do not degrade; in particular, the robust approxi-
mation ratio is at most that of the “worst” item (i.e. the item with the highest coefficient of
variation). In fact, for m independently (µ, σ)-distributed items the approximation ratio even
converges to optimality (Corollary 1); this can be seen as a reinterpretation of the known result
that full-bundling is asymptotically optimal for an additive bidder and many i.i.d. items (see
Hart and Nisan [31, A.5.]), but in our framework of minimal statistical information.
Although the mechanisms presented in Theorem 4 are extremely simple (lotteries over sep-
arate pricing or bundle pricing), we can actually show asymptotically matching lower bounds
with for any choice of the coefficients of variation:
Theorem 5. Fix any positive integer m and positive real numbers r1, . . . , rm, and let r =
maxj rj. Then, for any ε > 0, there exist ~µ = (µ1, . . . , µm) ∈ R>0, ~σ = (σ1, . . . , σm) ∈ Rm≥0 with
rj = σj/µj, such that
APX(~µ, ~σ) ≥ 1− ε+ ln(1 + r2).
Furthermore, this lower bound is achieved by independent (µj , σj)-distributions.
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Proof. Let m, r1, . . . , rm, ε be as in the statement of the theorem, and without loss assume
maxj rj = r1. Let δ > 0 be chosen such that δ ln(1 + r2)(1 + ln(1 + r2))2 < ε. We shall choose
the values for the mean and variance as
µ1 = 1, σ1 = r1,
µj =
δ
m− 1 , σj = rj
δ
m− 1 for j ≥ 2.
The idea is that we create a “bad” instance in which items 2, . . . ,m are rare event distri-
butions with very little welfare and so their contribution to the revenue will be negligible. To
that end, we must first introduce some notation. For every item j ≥ 2, denote
pj =
1
1 + r2j
, αj = (1 + r2j )
δ
m− 1 ,
and for every S ⊆ {2, . . . , n}, i.e. for every subset of the “low” items,
pS =
∏
j∈S
pj ·
∏
j 6∈S∪{1}
(1− pj).
Also, define the event
ES =
∧
j∈S
(vj = αj)
 ∧
 ∧
j /∈S∪{1}
(vj = 0)
 .
Next, let A be any m-dimensional truthful mechanism, i.e. a mechanism for selling m items
to a single bidder. For each S ⊆ {2, . . . , n}, let AS be the 1-dimensional mechanism induced
by event ES ; intuitively, this mechanism allocates according to A with the values vj set as in
ES , but discounting the payment by the welfare from items in S. Formally, if A is defined by
allocation and payment rules, A = (~x, pi), then AS = (xS , piS) can be defined as
xS(v1) = x1(v1, ~v−1), piS(v1) = pi(v1, ~v−1)− ~v−1 · ~x−1(0, ~v−1),
where ~v−1 = (v2, . . . , vm) and, for j ≥ 2, we have vj = αj if j ∈ S; and vj = 0 if j 6∈ S. One
can directly check that AS defines a truthful mechanism.
Now define A¯ = ∑S pSAS to be the convex combination of mechanisms AS . This can
be interpreted as the one-dimensional mechanism that samples a subset S ⊆ {2, . . . , n} with
probability pS and then runs mechanism AS . Finally, we apply Theorem 3 that ensures the
existence of a “bad” single-item distribution for mechanism AS , i.e. a distribution F1 with mean
µ1 and standard deviation σ1 such that
REV(A¯;F1) ≤ OPT(F1)1 + ln(1 + r2) . (10)
Each of the remaining distributions, Fj for j = 2, . . . ,m, is a rare event distribution that
assigns a mass of pj on value αj , and a mass of 1− pj on value 0. It is not hard to see that Fj
has the desired mean of µj and variance of σ2j . To conclude the proof, let F = F1 × · · · × Fm
be the product distribution corresponding to item-independent valuations; it only remains to
show that
OPT(F )
REV(A;F ) ≥ 1− ε+ ln(1 + r
2
1).
We first recall a standard revenue-decomposition inequality (see the proof of Hart and Nisan
[31, Lemma 8]). For any S ⊆ {2, . . . , n}, we know that
REV(A;F1 × · · · × Fm|ES) ≤ REV(AS ;F1) + VAL(F2 × · · · × Fm|ES).
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By the construction of our two-point mass distributions Fj , j ≥ 2, we know that ES form a
partition of all possible valuation profiles, each event occurring with probability pS ; in this way,
we can sum over the conditional expected revenues,
REV(A;F ) =
∑
S
pSREV(A;F1 × · · · × Fm|ES)
≤
∑
S
pS (REV(AS ;F1) + VAL(F2 × · · · × Fm|ES))
= REV
(∑
S
pSAS ;F1
)
+
∑
S
pSVAL(F2 × · · · × Fm|ES)
≤ OPT(F1)1 + ln(1 + r2) + VAL(F2 × · · · × Fm). (11)
Next, we consider two cases. If REV(A;F ) ≤ 1(1+ln(1+r2))2 , then recall that by the mechanism
presented in Theorem 2 one can extract revenue of at least 11+ln(1+r2) from F1, hence
OPT(F )
REV(A;F ) ≥
1/(1 + ln(1 + r2))
1/(1 + ln(1 + r2))2 = 1 + ln(1 + r
2).
Hence we can assume that REV(A;F ) ≥ 1(1+ln(1+r2))2 . Note that by selling the items
separately, and in particular using a price of αj for items j = 2, . . . ,m we can lower bound the
optimal revenue by
OPT(F1, F2, . . . , Fm) ≥ OPT(F1) +
m∑
j=2
OPT(Fj) = OPT(F1) + VAL(F2 × · · · × Fm). (12)
Using this bound, together with the derivation in (11) and the fact that VAL(F2×· · ·×Fm) = δ,
yields
OPT(F )
REV(A;F ) ≥
OPT(F1) + δ
REV(A;F )
≥ (1 + ln(1 + r
2))(REV(A;F )− δ) + δ
REV(A;F )
= 1 + ln(1 + r2)− δ ln(1 + r
2)
REV(A;F )
≥ 1 + ln(1 + r2)− δ ln(1 + r2)(1 + ln(1 + r2))2
≥ 1 + ln(1 + r2)− ε,
as we wanted to prove.
6 Further Results
6.1 Parametric Auctions with Lazy Reserves
In this section, we present (Corollary 2) an additional immediate consequence of our results to
the setting of Azar et al. [2]. Since this is not the main focus of our work, we refer to the above
papers, as well as Hartline [32, Ch. 4] for formal definitions. The key components are that
we consider a single-dimensional, matroid-constrained environment with n bidders, meaning
that the set of feasible allocations forms a matroid over {1, . . . , n}. A class of mechanisms of
particular interest are called Lazy-VCG with reserve prices (P1, . . . , Pn), where P1, . . . , Pn are
nonnegative random variables. This auction works by first selecting a welfare-maximizing setW
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of candidate winners (i.e. running a VCG auction) and then offering to an agent i ∈W a take-
it-or-leave-it price sampled according to Pi. An important result in this setting is the following
black-box reduction from many bidders to one bidder with good performance guarantees (see
also Chawla et al. [16, Thm. A.3]):
Theorem 6 (Azar et al. [2]). Assume a single-dimensional, matroid-constrained environment
with n bidders having valuations drawn independently from regular distributions F1, F2, . . . , Fn.
If P1, . . . , Pn are nonnegative random variables such that for all players i
Ep∼Pi [REV(p;Fi)] ≥ c1 ·OPT(Fi) and Ep∼Pi [WEL(p;Fi)] ≥ c2 ·VAL(Fi)
for constants c1, c2 ∈ [0, 1], then Lazy-VCG with random reserves (P1, . . . , Pn) guarantees (in
expectation) a 12c1-fraction of the optimal revenue and a c2-fraction of the optimal welfare.
As an immediate consequence, since our log-lotteries from Section 4 satisfy the conditions
of Theorem 6 with a suitable choice of c1, c2, we get the following:
Corollary 2. Assume a single-dimensional, matroid-constrained environment with n bidders
having independent regular valuations with mean µi and standard deviation σi. Then Lazy-
VCG with a reserve for player i drawn from the log-lottery P logµi,σi (see Definition 2) guarantees
a 2ρ(r)-approximation to the optimal revenue and a ρ(r)-approximation to the optimal welfare,
where r = maxi σiµi and function ρ(·) is defined in Definition 1.
Proof. Take c1 = c2 = 1ρ(r) ≤ 1ρ(σi/µi) for all i. Note that the welfare bounds come “for free”
since for any mechanism A ∈ A1 we have WEL(A;Fi) ≥ REV(A;Fi) and the upper bound in
Theorem 2 was derived with respect to VAL(Fi) = µi.
6.2 Regularity vs Dispersion
Note that regularity plays an important role in the previous Corollary 2, as it enables the black-
box reduction of Azar et al. [2] to achieve meaningful upper bounds on the robust approximation
ratio for a class of multi-bidder auctions. Given this observation, an obvious question would
be whether additional knowledge of regularity can help us design better auctions, even for the
single-item, single-bidder setting of Sections 3 and 4. In this section, we consider the notion
of λ-regularity, which has already been studied in the context of revenue maximization, e.g. by
Schweizer and Szech [50] and Cole and Rao [20], prove some basic results (Corollary 3) and
discuss some interesting implications.
Consider a continuous distribution F supported over an interval DF of nonnegative reals,
and a real parameter λ ∈ [0, 1]. Let f denote the density function of F . We will say that F is
λ-regular if its λ-generalized virtual valuation function
φλ(x) ≡ λ · x− 1− F (x)
f(x)
is monotonically nondecreasing in DF .
It is not difficult to see that, for any 0 ≤ λ ≤ λ′ ≤ 1, any λ-regular distribution is also
λ′-regular. For the special case of λ = 1, the above definition recovers exactly the standard
notion of regularity à la Myerson [45]. On the other extreme of the range, for λ = 0 we get the
definition of Monotone Hazard Rate (MHR) distributions. Intuitively, MHR distributions have
exponentially decreasing tails. Although they represent the strictest class within the λ-regularity
hierarchy, they are still general enough to give rise to a wide family of natural distributions,
such as the uniform, exponential, (truncated) normal and gamma.
We will also need the following auxiliary results for λ-regular distributions, which follow
from Propositions 2 and 4, and their corresponding proofs, of [50].
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Figure 3: (a) The robust approximation ratio upper bound when pricing at the mean µ of a λ-regular distribution.
(b) Description of our proposed single-item, single-bidder mechanism under knowledge of (µ, σ, λ). Note that
λ < 1/2 already implies an upper bound on the coefficient of variation σ/µ (black curve). Moreover, if σ/µ is
sufficiently small (in particular, smaller than the function of λ given by the red curve), then offering a lottery
over prices (blue area) guarantees a better approximation ratio than simply pricing at the mean (yellow area).
Proposition 3 (Schweizer and Szech [50]).
1. Let F be λ-regular for some λ ∈ [0, 1). Then F has a finite mean, say µ, and we have the
inequality
P (X > µ) ≥ (1− λ) 1λ for λ 6= 0, P (X > µ) ≥ 1
e
for λ = 0.
2. Let F be λ-regular for some λ ∈ [0, 1/2). Then F has a finite variance, say σ2, and we
have the inequality
σ2 ≤ µ
2
1− 2λ.
Now we can state our main result in this section:
Corollary 3. Consider a single-item, single-bidder setting in which the seller has knowledge
of the mean µ and an upper bound on the regularity λ ∈ (0, 1] of distribution F . Then we can
achieve a robust approximation ratio of (1− λ)−1/λ by offering the mean as a selling price.
Proof. Using an upper bound of µ on the revenue of an optimal auction, and the lower bound
on the selling probability given by Proposition 3, the result immediately follows as
OPT(F )
REV(µ;F ) ≤
µ
µ(1− λ)1/λ = (1− λ)
−1/λ.
Note that Corollary 3 gives an upper bound that degrades from e at λ = 0 (MHR), to ∞
at λ = 1 (regular); see Fig. 3a for a plot of this quantity. Next, we compare this ratio against
the logarithmic ratio from Theorem 2. In other words, consider a model in which the bidder
has information about three quantities of the distribution F : its mean µ, an upper bound of
σ2 on its variance, and an upper bound of λ on its “regularity”. Combining our results so far,
we can postulate a selling strategy, summarized in Fig. 3b. The first observation is that some
triples (µ, σ, λ) are infeasible in the following sense: if the seller knows an upper bound on λ,
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and furthermore λ < 1/2, then this immediately implies an upper bound on the coefficient of
variation by Proposition 3; in particular, the seller would know that σ/µ ≤ √1/(1− 2λ). Thus,
we can assume without loss that triple (µ, σ, λ) obeys this inequality.
Next, we compare the robust approximation ratios of our two candidate strategies, to deter-
mine when the log-lottery of Definition 2 outperforms the pricing-at-the-mean from Corollary 3.
This amounts to solving the inequality
ρ
(
σ
µ
)
≤ 1
(1− λ)1/λ .
Since ρ is strictly increasing, this is equivalent to
σ
µ
≤ ρ−1
( 1
(1− λ)1/λ
)
=
√
1
(1− λ)2/λ
(
2e(1−λ1/λ−1 − 1
)
− 1,
where for the last equality we simply rewrote the equation in Definition 1 in terms of r. The
conclusion is that the upper bound for the log-lottery is better than the upper bound for pricing-
at-the-mean iff σ/µ is below a certain cutoff point (which depends on λ). Note that Fig. 3b
does not show the actual approximation ratio, but rather it partitions the (λ, σ/µ)-space into
regions where (the approximation guarantee of) each mechanism is better.
Some additional observations about Fig. 3b are in order. First, in the limit λ→ 1, our best
guarantee comes from offering the log-lottery mechanism (i.e. knowledge of 1-regularity does
not improve the currently best known approximation guarantees for a single-item and a single-
bidder); secondly, there is a value of σ/µ, approximately equal to 0.61, below which offering the
log-lottery mechanism achieves a better guarantee than that provided by pricing-at-the-mean,
regardless of the regularity parameter λ ∈ [0, 1]. Intuitively, one could say that knowing that the
standard deviation of F is at most 61% its mean gives better revenue guarantees than knowing
that F is MHR, at least for single-item, single-bidder settings.
7 Discussion and Future Directions
In this paper, we studied the robust approximation ratio of revenue maximization under minimal
statistical information of the bidders’ prior distribution on the item valuations. The fundamental
quantities of interest turn out to be the coefficients of variation (CV), rj = σj/µj , of the
marginal distributions. For the single-item, single-bidder case we have completely characterized
this ratio for deterministic mechanisms (quadratic in r) and gave asymptotically tight bounds
for randomized mechanisms (logarithmic in r). This yields natural upper bounds for the multi-
item, single-additive-bidder setting, which are proven to be tight for any choice of the rj . As
an interesting consequence, we have observed how our results can be immediately applied to
the single-dimensional, multi-bidder setting proposed by Azar et al. [2], and also made a short
digression into a setting in which additional information on the regularity is assumed.
We believe that the general topic of “robust revenue with minimal statistical information”
gives rise to many interesting questions and variants; below we propose directions for possible
future work.
Approximation ratio vs absolute revenue As we already mentioned in the paper, besides
the robust approximation ratio in (3), another quantity of independent interest is that given
in (8):
sup
A∈A1
inf
F∈F
REV(A;F ).
This can be seen as a “vanilla” notion of robust revenue maximization, and it was considered
in Azar and Micali [3] (where they proved maximin optimality for deterministic mechanisms);
it was also of central interest in the work by Carrasco et al. [13].
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It is perhaps subjective to ask which, if any, of the two quantities is “better”, as both have
their merits. From a theoretical perspective, the absolute revenue in (8) is a simpler quantity
(e.g. it behaves linearly with respect to convex combinations of mechanisms and distributions)
and thus probably easier to extend to other settings; furthermore, it might be more appealing
to an economist. On the other hand, the approximation ratio in (3) is “dimensionless” or
“scale-free”, and arguably rather natural for a computer scientist.
Consider the following thought experiment, that highlights this comparison from a more
practical perspective. You are the head of a selling platform and your marketing team offers
you two possible selling mechanisms:
• Mechanism A (in expectation) guarantees 10$ on each item for sale, but only 25% of the
optimal revenue.
• Mechanism B (in expectation) guarantees 50% of the optimal revenue, but only 5$ on
each item for sale.
One possible answer could be that “it (almost) doesn’t matter”: for single-item random-
ized mechanisms, we proved that the maximin optimal lottery of Carrasco et al. [13] yields
asymptotically the best possible guarantee for the robust approximation ratio. However, it is
not at all clear if, in general settings, the maximin optimal auction always achieves a guarantee
“similar to” (say, a constant away of) the robust ratio-optimal auction. Providing an answer to
the debate above is of course beyond the scope of the present paper. Nevertheless, we briefly
presented it here as a potentially stimulating topic for future work and discussion, both from a
theoretical and an empirical/behavioural point of view.
Tighter bounds Although the single-item, single-bidder case is almost completely solved,
our tight analysis still has an “ε-gap” between the upper (Theorem 2) and lower (Theorem 3)
bounds; it would be worth trying to close this gap, either by providing stronger lower bound
instances, or by improving the upper bound analysis; similar comments apply to the multi-item,
single-bidder setting, where it would be interesting to quantify the finer dependencies of the
approximation ratio on various choices of (~µ, ~σ).
Multiple bidders We would also like to point out a qualitative change between the many-
items and many-bidders settings, when moving to them from the basic single-bidder, single-item
scenario: for a single bidder and many items, the approximation guarantee does not degrade;
it is essentially bounded by the approximation guarantee of the “worst” item (see Theorem 4).
For a single item and many bidders, however, even with the assumption of independent, regular
distributions, we gain an extra factor of 2 (see Corollary 2), coming from the general black
box reduction in Azar et al. [2]. It would be interesting to see if this factor can be dropped
(or alternatively, provide stronger lower bounds). We believe that a promising way to attack
this question would be to study existing or novel bounds on the coefficient of variation of
the maximum order statistic of random variables, which may be of independent interest to
statisticians. Of course, the most ambitious extension would be to consider multi-dimensional,
multi-bidder settings (a generalization of both our work and that of Azar et al. [2], Azar and
Micali [3]).
Finally, below we propose alternative, or more general, models of limited statistical infor-
mation that might be interesting for future work:
Intervals of confidence In some situations, it may be impractical to assume exact knowledge
of the mean µ of a distribution; instead, one could assume an estimate on the mean (via
historical data), say µ ∈ [µ, µ] or µ ∈ (1 ± ε)µ0. It would be interesting to incorporate this
type of information to the results presented in the present paper, and study how they affect the
approximation guarantees.
21
Broader classes of value functions An interesting next case would be to study the setting
of, say, a single unit-demand bidder and many items, or perhaps more generally, other valuation
models such as constrained additivity or submodularity.
Regularity vs dispersion In Section 6.2, we considered a very simple mechanism (price at
the mean) which achieves good performance guarantees for λ-regular distributions. Note that
λ was not used for designing the mechanism, but only for its analysis. Could we perhaps use
the knowledge of λ to design (possibly randomized) mechanisms with better performance? And
could we combine knowledge of λ and σ to design better mechanisms in a non-trivial way?
Higher-order moments Carrasco et al. [13] already looked at a single-item, single-bidder
case for the “vanilla” revenue maximization problem (8) under knowledge of the firstN moments
of the valuation distribution; they characterized the solution in terms of an N -dimensional
optimization problem, and briefly described it for the case of N = 3. The most intriguing
question in this line of work would be to understand the dependence of the approximation
guarantee on the number of moments N and, specifically, whether it converges to optimality
and at what rate. In other words, what would be the “moment complexity” of robust revenue
maximization?
A Technical Lemmas
Lemma 6. For any µ > 0 and σ ≥ 0, let r = σ/µ and
ρ = inf
0<p<µ
max
{
1 + σ
2
(µ− p)2 ,
µ
p
+ σ
2
p(µ− p)
}
. (13)
Then
• the infimum in (13) occurs at a point p∗ that is the unique positive solution of equation
(µ− p)3
2p− µ = σ
2.
• the value of the infimum, ρ, is the unique solution over [1,∞) of the equation
(ρ− 1)3
(2ρ− 1)2 = r
2,
and further satisfies
1 + 4r2 ≤ ρ ≤ 2 + 4r2 and p∗ = ρ2ρ− 1 · µ.
Proof. We begin by analysing when the first branch of the maximum in (13) is higher than the
second branch. Some algebraic manipulation yields
1 + σ
2
(µ− p)2 ≥
µ
p
+ σ
2
p(µ− p) ⇐⇒ (µ− p)
3 ≤ σ2(2p− µ). (14)
When p ≤ µ/2, the right expression is nonpositive and hence the second branch of the maximum
is highest. Next, observe that (µ−p)
3
2p−µ is decreasing over p ∈ (µ/2, µ), with a positive pole at
p = µ/2, and vanishing at p = µ. Hence, for any choice of µ, σ, there is a unique point p∗ at
which (14) holds with equality. It follows that for p ≥ p∗ the maximum is achieved on the first
branch and for p ≤ p∗ the maximum is achieved on the second branch.
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Next, observe that 1 + σ2(µ−p)2 is increasing on p ∈ (p∗, µ). To see that the second branch of
the maximum in (13) is decreasing on p ∈ (0, p∗), we take its derivative
d
dp
(
µ
p
+ σ
2
p(µ− p)
)
= −µ(µ− p)
2 + σ2(2p− µ)
p2(µ− p)2 .
When p ≤ p∗ we have (by definition of p∗) that σ2(2p − µ) ≤ (µ − p)3 and hence the above
quantity is at most −1/p, which is negative. We conclude that the minimum occurs when both
branches intersect, i.e. at p = p∗; using the fact that (µ − p∗)3 = σ2(2p∗ − µ), we can further
express the value of the minimum as
ρ = 1 + σ
2
(µ− p∗)2 = 1 +
µ− p∗
2p∗ − µ =
p∗
2p∗ − µ.
We can now use this to express p∗ in terms of ρ,
p∗ = ρ2ρ− 1 · µ; µ− p
∗ = µ(ρ− 1)2ρ− 1 ; 2p
∗ − µ = µ2ρ− 1 .
Putting these together, we get
σ2 = (µ− p
∗)3
2p∗ − µ = µ
2 (ρ− 1)3
(2ρ− 1)2 ⇐⇒
(ρ− 1)3
(2ρ− 1)2 =
(
σ
µ
)2
≡ r2.
One can directly check that the expression (ρ−1)
3
(2ρ−1)2 is increasing and goes from 0 at ρ = 1 to
∞ at ρ → ∞, so that for any nonnegative r there is a unique solution ρ ∈ [1,∞) to the above
equation. Moreover, we can write
r2 = (ρ− 1)
3
(2ρ− 1)2 =
1
4ρ−
1
4 −
(ρ− 34)(ρ− 1)
4(ρ− 12)2
⇐⇒ ρ = 1 + 4r2 + (ρ−
3
4)(ρ− 1)
(ρ− 12)2
;
since the fraction appearing on the right-hand side takes values between 0 and 1 (for ρ ∈ [1,∞)),
this gives us the desired global bounds.
Lemma (Lemma 1). For r > 0, let ρ(r) denote the (unique) positive solution of the equation
1
ρ2
(
2eρ−1 − 1
)
= r2 + 1.
Then, for any ε > 0, it holds that
ρ(r) ≤ 1 + (1 + ε) ln(1 + r2)
for large enough values of r.
Proof. Fix an ε > 0. For convenience, define the functions f, g : (0,∞) −→ R with
f(x) = 1
x2
(
2ex−1 − 1
)
and g(x) = 1 + (1 + ε) ln(1 + x2).
By considering their derivatives, it is straightforward to see that both f and g are increasing
functions. So, to prove our lemma, it is enough to show that
f(g(r)) ≥ r2 + 1
for large enough values of r.
Indeed, taking r large enough we can guarantee that
g(r) = 1 + (1 + ε) ln(1 + r2) ≤ (1 + r2)ε/2,
since ln(1 + x) = o(xε/2). Thus we have
f(g(r)) = 2e
g(r)−1 − 1
[g(r)]2
≥ 2e
(1+ε) ln(1+r2) − 1[
(1 + r2)ε/2
]2 = 2(1 + r2)1+ε − 1(1 + r2)ε = 2(1 + r2)− 1(1 + r2)ε
which is greater than 1 + r2 for large enough r, since 1xε = o(x).
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B Proof of Proposition 1
In this proof we refer to multiple points in the paper from Carrasco et al. [13]. The optimal
mechanism for (8) is given by the allocation rule (see their Proposition 4)
x(v) =

0, for v ≤ pi1,
λ1 ln vpi1 + 2λ2(v − pi1), for pi1 ≤ v ≤ pi2,
1, for pi2 ≤ v,
(15)
and the value of the maximin problem (8) is (see end of page 2745)
sup
A∈A1
inf
F∈Fµ,σ
REV(A;F ) = λ0 + λ1µ+ λ2(µ2 + σ2), (16)
where the values of λ0, λ1, λ2 are given by (see (B.4-B.6))
λ0 = − pi1(2pi2 − pi1)
2
(
pi2 ln pi2pi1 − (pi2 − pi1)
) ;λ1 = pi2
pi2 ln pi2pi1 − (pi2 − pi1)
;λ2 = − 1
2
(
pi2 ln pi2pi1 − (pi2 − pi1)
) .
(17)
Note that, as we explained at the end of Section 2.1, the allocation rule x(v) from (15) can
be interpreted as the cdf of a randomization over prices which forms an equivalent mechanism.
Moreover, by replacing the values of λ0, λ1, λ2 as in (17) we get
x(v) =
pi2 ln vpi1 − (v − pi1)
pi2 ln pi2pi1 − (pi2 − pi1)
,
which is exactly the log-lottery of Definition 2.
Finally, by replacing the values of λ0, λ1, λ2 from (17), and the values of µ and σ from
(5a),(5b), into (16), the value of the maximin problem can be greatly simplified to
λ0 + λ1µ+ λ2(µ2 + σ2)
= − pi1(2pi2 − pi1)
2
(
pi2 ln pi2pi1 − (pi2 − pi1)
) + pi2pi1
(
1 + ln pi2pi1
)
pi2 ln pi2pi1 − (pi2 − pi1)
− pi1(2pi2 − pi1)
2
(
pi2 ln pi2pi1 − (pi2 − pi1)
)
=
pi1
(
pi2 + pi2 ln pi2pi1 − 2pi2 + pi1
)
pi2 ln pi2pi1 − (pi2 − pi1)
= pi1,
as we wanted to prove.
C Asymptotics of the Mechanism by Azar and Micali [1]
In this section we look at the upper bound proposed in Azar and Micali [1, Thm. 1], which in
our setting can be written as
APX(µ, σ) ≤ 1
1− 32rk(r)
,
where k(r) is the unique positive solution of the cubic equation 1r =
1
2(3k + k3). Furthermore,
their guarantee is achieved by a deterministic selling price of p = µ − k(r)σ. We have the
following global bounds and asymptotics:
5Carrasco et al. [13] define their solutions in terms of the moments k1 ≡ µ and k2 ≡ µ2 + σ2.
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Lemma 7. For any µ > 0 and σ ≥ 0, let r = σ/µ and let k denote the unique real solution of
1
r =
1
2(3k + k3). Furthermore, let ρ˜ =
1
1− 32 rk
and p = µ − kσ. Then ρ˜ is the unique solution
over [1,∞) of the equation
27
4 r
2 = (ρ˜− 1)
3
ρ˜2
,
and further satisfies
1 + 274 r
2 ≤ ρ˜ ≤ 3 + 274 r
2 and p = ρ˜+ 23ρ˜ · µ.
Proof. We begin by rewriting k in terms of ρ˜,
ρ˜ = 1
1− 32rk
⇐⇒ k = 23r
ρ˜− 1
ρ˜
;
plugging this in the cubic equation for k, and doing some manipulation, gives
1
r
= 12
(
2
r
ρ˜− 1
ρ˜
+ 827r3
(ρ˜− 1)3
ρ˜3
)
⇐⇒ 274 r
2 = (ρ˜− 1)
3
ρ˜2
.
One can directly check that the expression (ρ˜−1)
3
ρ˜2 is increasing and goes from 0 at ρ˜ = 1 to
∞ at ρ˜ → ∞, so that for any nonnegative r there is a unique solution ρ˜ ∈ [1,∞) to the above
equation. Moreover, we can write
p = µ− kσ = µ− 23
σ
r
ρ˜− 1
ρ˜
= ρ˜+ 23ρ˜ · µ
and
27
4 r
2 = (ρ˜− 1)
3
ρ˜
= ρ˜− 1− (2ρ˜− 1)(ρ˜− 1)
ρ˜2
⇐⇒ ρ˜ = 1 + 274 r
2 + (2ρ˜− 1)(ρ˜− 1)
ρ˜2
.
Since the fraction appearing on the right-hand side takes values between 0 and 2 (for ρ˜ ∈ [1,∞)),
this gives us the desired global bounds.
D Yao’s Principle for Arbitrary Measures
Lemma 8. Let (X,ΣX ,F) and (Y,ΣY ,G) be arbitrary probability spaces,6 i.e.
• ΣX and ΣY are σ-algebras over X and Y respectively;
• F and G are probability measures over (X,ΣX) and (Y,ΣY ) respectively.
Let also h : X × Y → R≥0, g(y)→ R>0 be measurable functions. Then7
sup
y∈Y
g(y)
Ex∼F [h(x, y)]
≥ inf
x∈X
Ey∼G [g(y)]
Ey∼G [h(x, y)]
.
6For formal definitions of the measure-theoretic notions used in this lemma see, e.g., Tao [52].
7Throughout this lemma, we handle ratios of the form g
h
where g > 0 and h ≥ 0. For convenience, if h = 0
we interpret the ratio as being equal to ∞. This means that, for any nonnegative real number α, we have the
following relation, even when h = 0:
g
h
≥ α ⇐⇒ g ≥ α · h.
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Proof. Let α be an arbitrary nonnegative real number, and suppose that
inf
x∈X
Ey∼G [g(y)]
Ey∼G [h(x, y)]
≥ α, (18)
that is, Ey∼G [g(y)] ≥ α supx∈X Ey∈G [h(x, y)]. This implies that, for every x ∈ X, we have
Ey∼G [g(y)] ≥ αEy∈G [h(x, y)]. Hence, by sampling x according to F , we also have
Ey∼G [g(y)] ≥ αEx∼F [Ey∼G [h(x, y)]] = αEy∼G [Ex∼F [h(x, y)]];
the equality holds due to Tonelli’s theorem (see, e.g., Tao [52, Theorem 1.7.15]), since h is
measurable and nonnegative, and F , G are finite measures. By the previous inequality between
expectations, we must conclude that it holds for some realization of G, that is, there must exist
y ∈ supp(G) such that g(y) ≥ αEx∼F [h(x, y)]. This implies that
g(y)
Ex∼F [h(x, y)]
≥ α, and hence sup
y∈Y
g(y)
Ex∼F [h(x, y)]
≥ α.
As α was any real number that satisfies (18), the desired inequality follows.
Lemma (Lemma 3). For µ > 0, σ ≥ 0, let ∆µ,σ denote the class of (µ, σ) mixtures, that is, the
class of mixtures over Fµ,σ. Then
inf
A∈A1
sup
F∈Fµ,σ
OPT(F )
Ep∼A[REV(p;F )]
≥ sup
(Θ,F )∈∆µ,σ
inf
p≥0
Eθ∼Θ[OPT(Fθ)]
Eθ∼Θ[REV(p;Fθ)]
.
Proof. Start by fixing an arbitrary truthful mechanism A ∈ A1 and an arbitrary (µ, σ) mixture
(Θ,F ) over parameter space T . Since A can be interpreted as a randomization over prices,
(R≥0,L, A) is a well-posed probability space.
Next, define the functions
h : R≥0 × T → R, g : T → R;
h(p, θ) = REV(p;Fθ); g(θ) = OPT(Fθ).
Clearly, h is nonnegative and g is positive since Fθ is (µ, σ)-distributed. We just need to
argue that both are measurable. Note that
h(p, θ) = REV(p;Fθ) = p(1− Fθ(p−)) = inf
y<p
p(1− F (y; θ)).
As F is measurable and taking extrema preserves measurability, so is h. In a similar way, g is
measurable as it can be expressed as the supremum
g(θ) = OPT(Fθ) = sup
p≥0
REV(p;Fθ).
Hence, we can directly apply Lemma 8 and conclude that
sup
F∈Fµ,σ
OPT(F )
Ep∼A[REV(p;F )]
≥ sup
θ∈T
OPT(Fθ)
Ep∼A[REV(p;Fθ)]
≥ inf
p≥0
Eθ∼Θ[OPT(Fθ)]
Eθ∼Θ[REV(p;Fθ)]
.
As A and (Θ,F ) were arbitrary, we can take the supremum on the right-hand side over
(µ, σ) mixtures, and the infimum on the left-hand side over truthful mechanisms; the result
follows.
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